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Bringing Agency Back into Network Research:  
Constrained Agency and Network Action 
 
Abstract: This article enriches the conception of agency that 
prevails in network research by proposing a framework of 
constrained agency. Our framework is grounded in the resources 
and motivations that actors draw on within their structurally 
constrained context. Structural positions influence the resources 
available to actors and color the motivations that shape their 
actions. At the same time resources equip actors to exert agency 
while motivations propel them to do so. Examining how specific 
resources are used when particular motivations are operative 
reveals ideal types of constrained agency. Within the wide range of 
actions that constrained agency can encompass, we focus on 
network action. We derive a typology of network actions and 
illustrate how the form of constrained agency through which a 
particular network action is taken can affect actors’ ensuing 
structural positions and the nature of the constraints they 
subsequently face. We conclude by discussing how this 
conceptualization of constrained agency can help identify new 
sources of endogenous change in network structure and can serve 
as a guide for future empirical research.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Social theorists have long debated the relative contributions of human agency and structure to 
social interactions and network dynamics (Bourdieu, 1986; Giddens, 1984; Sewell, 1992). This 
debate has typically focused on the extent to which and the conditions under which actors can 
exercise agency in the face of structural constraints. It has also explored the multiple facets of 
structural constraint and the mechanisms whereby it can limit agency. Yet empirical research has 
largely continued to privilege structure over agency; when agency is invoked, the mechanisms by 
which actors exert agency remain under-theorized (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998). Though it 
characterizes organizational sociology in general, this pattern is particularly striking in the study 
of social networks, which has emphasized documenting how actors’ social networks shape their 
behavior and outcomes.  
This article offers a richer conception of the interplay between constraint and agency. We 
strive to make three main contributions to network research. First, we propose a framework that 
clarifies how structure constrains action and then elucidates the microfoundations of agency in 
the face of structural constraint. In short, we propose a framework of constrained agency.
1
 Our 
framework begins with the assumption that structural positions influence the resources available 
to actors and color the motivations that shape their actions. It illuminates the role of resources in 
equipping actors to exert agency, and that of motivations in propelling them to do so. In other 
words, resources indicate how actors exert agency (e.g., Gulati, 2007), while motivations 
represent why they exert agency.
2
 To derive ideal types of constrained agency, we examine how 
resources are used when particular motivations are operative. Though constrained agency can 
                                                          
1
 Our framework applies to both individuals and organizations as social actors.  
2
 In considering actors’ motivations to exert agency, we are not making a functionalist argument along the lines 
criticized by Granovetter (1992: 48-51). We focus on the dynamics of agency rather than a static view, and seek to 
make forward-looking predictions rather than just to explain past outcomes.  
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encompass a wide range of actions, we focus on one elemental form of action: network action. 
Second, we derive a typology of network actions and demonstrate how our framework of 
constrained agency can enrich understanding of the dynamics of each form of action. Finally, we 
illustrate how the form of constrained agency operative in a particular network action can have 
consequences for actors’ ensuing structural positions and the nature of the constraints they 
subsequently face. Finally, we discuss how this conceptualization of constrained agency can help 
identify new sources of endogenous change in network structure and can serve as a guide for 
empirical research. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Early conceptual work on social networks emphasized the primacy of structure (Wellman, 1983; 
Wellman and Berkowitz, 1988; White, Boorman, and Breiger, 1976). Consider, for example, 
Mayhew’s (1980: 339) critique of social theories that privilege the individual over social 
structure: “If one assumes the structure of society in order to examine its impact on the 
immediate acts, thoughts, and feelings of individuals, one has assumed most of what has to be 
explained (indeed, about 95 percent of the variation in human society) in order to study a small 
part of human activity and experience (about 5 percent—and as such, difficult to distinguish 
from random noise).” Mayhew’s conceptual perspective was a direct challenge to an alternative 
view that highlighted the role of individual action. Homans (1964: 818), for example, argued, “If 
a serious effort is made to construct theories that even begin to explain social phenomena, it 
turns out that their general propositions are not about the equilibrium of societies but about the 
behavior of men.” Social theorists have taken different sides in this debate, but empirical 
network research has usually favored structural determinism.   
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The structure–agency debate has played out across a variety of research traditions in 
sociology, notably in institutional theory. Though early research tended to emphasize the role of 
institutions in shaping organizational choices and outcomes (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977), a movement to elevate the role of agency in institutional change has emerged 
in recent years (Barley and Tolbert, 1997; Battilana, Leca, and Boxenbaum, 2009; Suddaby, 
Elsbach, Greenwood, Meyer, and Zilber, 2010). A growing body of work has highlighted the 
role of institutional entrepreneurs as actors who break rules and reject practices associated with a 
dominant logic (DiMaggio, 1988; Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006). And institutional processes 
have been shown to give rise to a variety of specific strategic responses, such as acquiescing, 
compromising, avoiding, defying, and manipulating (Oliver, 1991). Indeed, the shift from 
“determinant to interactive arguments” is by now a well-documented trend in institutional theory 
(Scott, 2008: 429).  
In the social-networks tradition too, theory development has witnessed a swing from 
largely structural accounts to those in which individual choice and action feature more 
prominently. Granovetter’s (1985: 487) notion of embeddedness served as a rallying cry to strike 
a better balance between structural and agentic accounts: “A fruitful analysis of human action 
requires us to avoid the atomization implicit in the theoretical extremes of under- and 
oversocialized conceptions. Actors do not behave or decide as atoms outside a social context, nor 
do they adhere slavishly to a script written for them by the particular intersection of social 
categories that they happen to occupy.” Unfortunately, few compelling attempts have been made 
to reconcile the over- and under-socialized perspectives conceptually or empirically.  
Coleman’s (1990) theory of social action, grounded in methodological individualism, 
provided an important means to try to find balance—though many have argued that its central 
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focus on agency in purposive action undertaken by utility-maximizing individuals was overly 
restrictive (see, for example, Small, 2009). Coleman’s conception of individual agency, bounded 
by such constraints as obligations and expectations, inspired several prominent network theories. 
Burt’s (1982: ix) theory of structural action, for example, asserted that “Actors are purposive 
under social structural constraint.” Indeed, across the expanse of his research, Burt (1982, 1992, 
2004, 2005) has sought to explain how structure impinges on people’s views of their social 
worlds and on the capabilities they develop. Structure thus shapes action. Yet, in Burt’s 
framework as in Coleman’s, agency is defined as purposive action undertaken by actors seeking 
to advance their own interests. As Burt (1992: 5) writes: “[P]eople and organizations are not the 
source of action so much as they are the vehicles for structurally induced action.” Thus, even 
Burt’s version of constrained action pays less attention to how actors exert agency than to how 
structure constrains their actions. (But see Burt, 2010: 224-227, for a more recent critique of 
theories that "assume away" or "hold constant" agency, and for an articulation of a model of 
"endogenous agency" in which agency is determined by network context but plays a more 
prominent role.) 
Despite attempts by Coleman, Burt, and others to find the middle ground, Granovetter’s 
(1985) call to strike a better balance between over-socialized and under-socialized conceptions of 
social action has not been thoroughly fulfilled. With a few notable exceptions, researchers have 
treated structure as more or less given, and have paid less attention to how actors create, 
perpetuate, and modify structure through their actions. As a result, network research continues to 
generate numerous calls to account better for the role of human agency (Emirbayer, 1997; 
Emirbayer and Goodwin, 1994; Ibarra, Kilduff, and Tsai, 2005). Even studies that employ 
longitudinal research designs (for a recent review, see Ahuja, Soda, and Zaheer, 2012) have 
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tended to adopt a limiting set of assumptions and to favor structural accounts. The forces that 
enable and motivate constrained agency have therefore remained under-specified and poorly 
theorized. 
 
TOWARD A FRAMEWORK OF CONSTRAINED AGENCY 
Our proposed framework draws inspiration from prior conceptual work suggesting that agency 
and structure are subtly intertwined, in such a way that structure is simultaneously exogenous 
and endogenous (Bourdieu, 1977; Gulati, 1995; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Padgett and Ansell, 
1993). In this tradition, structure shapes agency and the actions that follow, but is subsequently 
affected by those actions. We begin by considering an actor’s position in social structure.3 This 
position shapes a set of resources that are accessible to actors and makes salient a set of 
motivations.
4
 For example, structural positions impart resources in the form of cultural capital 
(Bourdieu, 1986). Motivations, which are based in part on actors’ understanding of what actions 
are “possible, legitimate, and interpretable,” also derive from structural positions (Fligstein and 
McAdam, 2012: 11). In this sense, structure serves to constrain agency. Much has been written 
about how structure shapes behavior, but it is less well understood how agency operates within 
this constrained context. We propose that the same two key facets of constraint, resources and 
motivations, also help unpack the dynamic unfolding of agency within social structure. 
Resources equip actors to exert agency in the face of constraint, and motivations propel them to 
do so. Thus, resources and motivations that were initially constrained by structure subsequently 
                                                          
3
 Consistent with Barley and Tolbert (1997) and Stevenson and Greenburg (2000), we argue that structure does not 
exist without action but that some aspects of the social world can be taken to preexist. 
4
 Resources and motivations have served as essential building blocks for theorizing about structure and agency in 
classical accounts—such as Parsons’ (1951) theory of social action, Giddens’ (1984) theory of structuration, and 
Sewell’s (1992) theory of structure—and in contemporary work such as Fligstein and McAdam’s (2012) theory of 
social fields. Yet prior theories have not adequately combined these building blocks to construct a unified 
perspective on constrained agency and network action. 
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give rise to agency. The motivations that cause resources to be used identify ideal types, or 
forms, of constrained agency. A wide range of actions can arise through constrained agency. Our 
arguments pertain to an elemental form of action: network action, or the concrete actions that an 
actor can take with respect to a given social relation. The form of constrained agency embodied 
in network action can influence actors’ subsequent structural positions and transform the 
fundamental nature and purpose of their social relations. Thus, constrained agency influences the 
resources and motivations likely to animate actors’ future attempts at agency. In this sense, 
agency gives rise to subsequent constraint. In short, this conceptualization helps specify both 
how actors exert agency in the face of constraint and how their actions create new constraints.  
We will first describe two distinct types of resources and two core motivations that are in 
part determined by actors’ structural positions. Resources and motivations each provide a partial 
window into how actors’ structural position and social relations might change when they take 
network action. The resources used to take network action affect the fundamental purpose and 
meaning of social relations, while the motivations underpinning network action can shift 
structural positions. A more complete understanding of these changes emerges when one 
considers the motivations by which resources are utilized. We next characterize four ideal types 
of constrained agency—that is, distinct combinations of resources and motivations. We then 
derive a typology of network actions and illustrate how the constrained-agency framework can 
enrich our understanding of the dynamics associated with each network action.  
 
Resources 
Social theorists have defined resources in a variety of ways, ranging from media that can serve as 
sources of power (Giddens, 1984) to schema that enable actors to overcome constraint (Sewell, 
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1992). We define resources, whose nature is in part determined by the structural position an actor 
occupies, as the means by which they take action in the face of structural constraint. We further 
distinguish between two kinds of resources: capability-based and symbolic.  
By capability-based resources, we mean the skills, dispositions, and cognitive 
orientations that actors possess. These resources provide actors superior insight with which to 
map and navigate their social environments. For example, prior research has identified such 
individual-level attributes such as need for cognition (Anderson, 2008), self-monitoring 
orientation (Mehra, Kilduff, and Brass, 2001; Mehra and Schenkel, 2008; Oh and Kilduff, 2008; 
Sasovova, Mehra, Borgatti, and Schippers, 2010), tertius iungens orientation (Obstfeld, 2005), 
implicit collaborative self-concept (Srivastava and Banaji, 2011), and accuracy of cognition 
about informal structure (Krackhardt, 1990) as associated with an actor’s ability to migrate into 
advantaged structural positions. At the organizational level, similarly, such capabilities as the 
ability to visualize alliance portfolios in relation to the entire industry (Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 
2009) and the ability to channel resources from network partners (Gulati, Lavie, and Madhavan, 
2011) can propel firms into positions of advantage. 
By symbolic resources, we refer to cultural objects (Lamont and Small, 2008) such as 
frames (McLean, 1998) and their associated schemata (Srivastava, 2012b), worldviews (Vaisey 
and Lizardo, 2010), and narratives (Somers, 1994). These resources enable actors to shape and 
alter the meaning and purpose of social relations (cf. DiMaggio, 1997; Emirbayer and Goodwin, 
1994); thus they importantly determine the content that flows through social ties. Symbolic 
resources do not merely shape the meaning and purpose of interpersonal relations; they also 
influence inter-organizational ties—such as through cooperative norms that vary across national 
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contexts and affect the configuration of alliance networks (Vasudeva, Spencer, and Teegen, 
forthcoming).   
 
Motivations  
Actors deploy resources to achieve a variety of aims. These motivations, which are shaped by 
actors’ structural positions, also propel them to take action in the face of constraint. Two 
elemental motivations are instrumental action and expressive action (Ibarra, 1992; Lin, 2001; 
Rossel, 1970). 
In instrumental action, actors aim to improve their structural position. At both the 
interpersonal and inter-organizational levels, two of the most common forms of instrumental 
action are the search for novel information (e.g., Ahuja, 2000a; Burt, 1992) and the pursuit of 
influence to manage interdependencies with other actors (e.g., Aiken and Hage, 1968; Brass, 
1984; Galaskiewicz, 1982; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  
In expressive action, actors seek to legitimize and consolidate their existing structural 
position. Two of the most common forms of expressive action are the search for identity 
confirmation (e.g., Milton and Westphal, 2005; Podolny and Baron, 1997; White, 1992, 2008) 
and the pursuit of positive affect (e.g., Baker, Cross, and Wooten, 2003; Casciaro and Lobo, 
2008). Expressive action is not confined to interpersonal relations. Identity-based (e.g., Brickson, 
2005) and affective (Westphal, Boivie, and Han Ming Chng, 2006) motivations can also 
influence the pattern of inter-organizational ties. We will next consider the differential 
consequences of using capability-based and symbolic resources when instrumental and 
expressive motivations are both operative.  
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IDEAL TYPES OF CONSTRAINED AGENCY 
Resources and motivations need to be used together, like binocular lenses, to arrive at a more 
complete understanding of how network action is likely to change structural positions and the 
nature of relationships, thus creating new forms of constraint. The nature of the resource used 
has implications for whether the fundamental purpose and meaning of social relations are likely 
to remain stable or change. By contrast, the motivations with which resources are deployed 
determine the likelihood that the actor will experience a change in, or consolidation of, structural 
position. Together, resources and motivations define four ideal types of constrained agency, 
summarized in Table 1.  
- Insert Table 1 about here - 
 
Maneuvering: Marshaling Capability-Based Resources to Achieve Instrumental Aims  
Actors’ positions in a social structure endow them with certain capabilities. For example, the 
position that software developers occupy within a firm’s task network can affect their cognitive 
judgments about means–ends relationships in successful product development (Walker, 1985). 
By contrast, actors in disadvantaged structural positions will often be motivated to improve their 
standing (Pettit, Yong, and Spataro, 2010). Maneuvering is the use of capability-based resources 
(i.e., skills, dispositions, and cognitive orientations) for instrumental purposes (i.e., with the 
intent to improve an actor’s structural position). At the interpersonal level, examples of 
Maneuvering include the efforts of high self-monitors to identify and claim new and emerging 
brokerage positions (Sasovova et al., 2010), entrepreneurs’ use of varying interpersonal “styles” 
to influence the type of economic exchange into which they enter (Vissa, 2012), and actors’ 
awareness of and ability to influence the choices of other actors—particularly those to whom 
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they are connected indirectly (Brass, 2012). At the inter-organizational level, Maneuvering 
includes peripheral actors’ efforts to form coalitions with other actors and thus exert political 
influence (Stevenson and Greenburg, 2000) and firms’ attempts to apply competitive acumen—
the extent to which their assessment of a rival’s prioritization of competitors matches the rival’s 
own view—to move to superior market positions (Tsai, Su, and Chen, 2011). Structure impinges 
on Maneuvering primarily via insight—that is, structure can limit actors’ understanding and 
knowledge of how to navigate an advantageous course of action.  
Maneuvering often produces a change in structural position, as actors parlay resources 
they already possess to acquire new information or sources of influence. Because it does not 
entail the use of symbolic resources, Maneuvering tends not to fundamentally change the 
purpose or meaning attached to an actor’s relationships.  
 
Fortifying: Marshaling Capability-Based Resources to Achieve Expressive Aims 
In some cases, actors seek to legitimize and consolidate structural positions that they already 
occupy. For example, the sequence of foreign-investment networks built and maintained by 
Hungarian firms during periods of economic transition has sometimes embodied attempts to 
consolidate positions (Stark and Vedres, 2006). Fortifying is the use of capability-based 
resources (skills, dispositions, and cognitive orientations) for expressive purposes (with the 
intent to legitimize and consolidate an actor’s existing structural position). Examples of 
Fortifying include deployment of a novel kind of ‘style,’ or manner of perpetuating and diffusing 
stories, to affirm identities and relationships (Godart and White, 2010; White, 1992, 2008); use 
of emotional intelligence to build and sustain affective relations (see, for example, Lopes et al., 
2004); and use of cognitive and motivational attributes to form energizing relationships in 
13 
 
organizational settings (Baker et al., 2003). Structure constrains Fortifying primarily via action—
that is, structure can limit actors’ repertoires for making consolidating or legitimizing moves.   
Fortifying typically does not entail a change in structural position, as resources are 
deployed to legitimize and consolidate existing positions. Nor does it fundamentally alter the 
purpose or meaning of social relations—though affirmation of identity and sharing of sentiments 
may lead to a strengthening of the relationship between two actors.  
 
Reorienting: Marshaling Symbolic Resources to Achieve Instrumental Aims  
Structural positions do not merely endow actors with particular capabilities; they also help define 
the set of symbolic resources—such as collective action frames—that are accessible to actors 
(Chattopadhyay, Glick, and Huber, 2001; Jackson and Dutton, 1988). A third ideal type, 
Reorienting, entails the use of these symbolic resources for instrumental purposes (with the 
intent of improving an actor’s structural position). Examples of Reorienting include Renaissance-
era patronage letters, in which actors invoke and manipulate frames to improve network 
positions over time (McLean, 1998) and sports talk in the workplace, which unites men across 
class boundaries and enables them to more effectively coordinate instrumental activity (Erickson, 
1996). Structure impinges on Reorienting primarily via recombination—that is, by limiting the 
number and variety of novel combinations of symbolic resources that can be assembled to 
advance an actor’s interests.  
Like Maneuvering, Reorienting is intended to produce a change in structural position— 
typically through the acquisition of new information or influence. Because actors use symbolic 
rather than capability-based resources, they are also likely to change the purpose or meaning 
attached to a tie in the course of moving to an advantaged structural position. That is, the most 
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profound changes in social structure are likely to result from the Reorienting form of constrained 
agency. 
   
Anchoring: Marshaling Symbolic Resources to Achieve Expressive Aims 
As noted, actors sometimes seek to consolidate or legitimize structural positions they already 
occupy. The fourth ideal type of constrained agency, anchoring, occurs when actors marshal 
symbolic resources for expressive purposes (with the intent to legitimize and consolidate an 
existing structural position). Examples of Anchoring include the use of a symbolic resource, 
shared moral order, to produce a sense of community among members of urban communes 
(Vaisey, 2007); efforts to employ symbols drawn from different network cultures to construct 
alternative meanings of love (Yeung, 2005); and the use of narratives to construct and affirm 
identities (Somers, 1994). Structure constrains Anchoring primarily via meaning—that is, by 
limiting the sense of significance and purpose that can be attached to a given action.  
Like Fortifying, this ideal type often results in consolidation of structural position, rather 
than a change in that position. Here too, because actors use symbolic rather than capability-based 
resources, they are likely to change the purpose or meaning attached to a tie in the course of 
moving to an advantaged structural position. 
 
CONSTRAINED AGENCY AND NETWORK ACTION 
We turn next to exploring how our framework of constrained agency can help inform our 
understanding of the dynamics of network action, and therefore serve as a guide for empirical 
research. By network action, we mean the concrete choices that actors make with respect to a 
given social tie. We will highlight four primary network actions, which jointly span all stages in 
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the lifecycle of a social tie: Acquiring, Activating, Altering, and Adjusting. Figure 1 is a 
schematic representation of these network actions. We will describe each action and then 
illustrate how our constrained-agency framework can enrich our understanding of the dynamics 
associated with these network actions: 
- Insert Figure 1 about here - 
 Acquiring. Perhaps the most fundamental network action is acquiring a new tie where 
one did not previously exist. A variety of factors, such as shared activities and interests 
(Feld, 1981), resource dependence and cumulative prior ties (Gulati, 1995; Gulati and 
Gargiulo, 1999), inducements and opportunities  (Ahuja, 2000b), the nature of ambient 
uncertainty (Beckman, Haunschild, and Phillips, 2004), and the visualization of network 
portfolios (Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009), are known to influence new tie formation. 
 Activating. When the need arises, actors convert pre-existing dormant or latent ties into 
active relationships (Hurlbert, Haines, and Beggs, 2000; Levin, Walter, and Murnighan, 
2011; Mariotti and Delbridge, 2012; Renzulli and Aldrich, 2005). A variety of factors— 
such as the level of interpersonal trust (Renzulli and Aldrich, 2005; Smith, 2005), 
identification strength (McDonald and Westphal, 2003), interpersonal affect (Casciaro 
and Lobo, 2008), the structure of pre-existing core networks (Hurlbert et al., 2000), and 
aspects of formal and quasi-formal organizational structure (Srivastava, 2012a)—can all 
drive a wedge between the resources potentially accessible through networks and those 
actually tapped in a given situation.  
 Altering. A third network action, Altering, also involves pre-existing social ties but goes 
beyond simply activating a dormant or latent tie. It entails changing the content that flows 
through a tie—for example, task advice, buy-in, strategic information, or social support 
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(Burt, 1997; Podolny and Baron, 1997). Network structural characteristics and the 
strength of the ties between actors can influence their ability to change the content that 
flows through such ties (Shipilov and Li, 2012; Sosa, 2011). 
 Adjusting. Finally, a pre-existing tie can be Adjusted. Adjusting occurs when a tie is 
deactivated—allowed to shift from an active to a dormant or latent state—or purposely 
severed. A variety of factors are known to influence the dissolution or persistence of a tie. 
At the individual level, tie decay is inhibited when connections are embedded in stable 
relationships (Burt, 2001, 2002), and also influenced by tie strength, network density, and 
actors’ sociodemographic traits (Lubbers et al., 2010). At the inter-organizational level, 
tie dissolution is influenced by uncertainty, including access to critical resources, and a 
need to manage competition with rivals (Westphal et al., 2006), and forms of 
embeddedness, such as relational, positional, and structural (Polidoro, Ahuja, and 
Mitchell, 2011; Cui, Calantone, and Griffith, 2011; Greve, Mitsuhashi, and Baum, 
forthcoming).  
To illustrate how the constrained agency framework informs our understanding of the 
dynamics of network action, let us consider the network action of Activating—converting a 
dormant or latent social tie into an active relationship. Activating that occurs in the course of 
Maneuvering is likely to lead to a change in social structural position as the focal actor acquires 
new information or influence that makes such a change of position possible. It is unlikely, 
however, to fundamentally change the nature of the relationship with the activated contact 
because it relies on pre-existing and probably familiar capabilities. By contrast, when Activating 
occurs as a manifestation of Fortifying, the focal actor is likely to consolidate rather than shift 
structural position, but—via the sharing of sentiments or affirmation of identities—also to 
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strengthen the tie to the activated contact. Activating that occurs in the process of Reorienting is 
likely to produce the most profound change; the focal actor is likely both to move to a different 
structural position by virtue of newly acquired information or influence and to experience a 
fundamental shift in the nature of the relationship to the activated contact. Finally, Activating 
that occurs in the course of Anchoring is likely to transform the relationship with the activated 
contact but not to lead to a significant change in structural position. In short, the particular type 
of constrained agency that is operative when Activation occurs has important implications for the 
actor’s likely future structural position and for the nature and quality of subsequent relationships. 
Thus it can also influence the resources and motivations that will shape future attempts at 
exercising agency in the face of constraint.  
We have illustrated the utility of the constrained-agency framework using one network 
action, but this approach can yield comparably rich insight about other network actions. For 
example, we expect that the implications of the prevailing form of constrained agency would be 
similar between Activating and Altering, given that both network actions occur in the context of 
a pre-existing relationship. In the case of Acquiring, where there is no pre-existing relationship, 
we conjecture that the form of constrained agency operative when a tie is formed leaves an 
imprint on the relationship that affects the subsequent evolution of the relationship (cf. McEvily, 
Jaffee, and Tortoriello, 2012). For example, if a tie is initially formed for instrumental reasons 
(Maneuvering or Reorienting), it may be harder to later activate that tie for expressive purposes 
(Fortifying or Anchoring). Finally, in the case of Adjusting, the form of constrained agency 
through which an active relationship becomes dormant or is dissolved might affect the focal 
actor’s ability to activate or rekindle the relationship later. For example, ties dissolved in the 
course of Maneuvering or Reorienting may be harder to activate or rekindle for expressive 
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purposes. In other words, understanding the interplay of constrained agency and network action 
promises to help empirical researchers make sharper predictions about the dynamics of social 
networks, such as (1) which ties are likely to remain stable or be transformed, (2) which actors 
are likely to change or maintain their structural position, and (3) how actors’ resources and 
motivations are likely to shift as a result of (1) and (2) and how these shifts can impose new 
constraints on subsequent action. We therefore believe that empirical network research would be 
greatly enriched if it assessed not only what network action occurred in a social setting but also 
the form of constrained agency through which it took place. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The goal of this article has been to introduce a richer conception of agency into network 
research. We propose a framework of constrained agency that is grounded in resources and 
motivations, two essential building blocks of classical and contemporary theories of social 
action. Positions in a social structure importantly shape actors’ resources and motivations; in 
turn, resources equip actors to exert agency while motivations propel them to do so. Examining 
how resources are used when distinct motivations are operative reveals ideal types of constrained 
agency. The form of constrained agency through which a particular network action is taken can 
affect actors’ ensuing structural positions and the nature of the constraints they subsequently 
face.  
 We see at least four fruitful directions for empirical research that seeks to validate and 
advance this conceptualization of constrained agency. First, we see significant potential in multi-
method studies that bring together quantitative analyses of network change (e.g., Snijders, 
Steglich, and Schweinberger, 2007; Snijders, van de Bunt, and Steglich, 2010) with qualitative 
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accounts of the cultural and symbolic meaning associated with network change (e.g., McLean, 
1998; Mische, 2003). The latter can help pinpoint the form of constrained agency through which 
network actions occur and thus produce more accurate predictions about how networks are likely 
to evolve. Second, we suspect that further field research will uncover additional ideal types of 
constrained agency, as well as hybrid forms. Further conceptual work is needed to more fully 
explore the factors that lead actors to operate in a given mode of constrained agency, how the 
various forms of constrained agency relate to one another, and how they differentially influence 
the dynamics of network action. Third, we have focused on one elemental form of action, 
network action, but this approach could be extended to such other forms of action as political 
action and collective action in the context of social movements (Fernandez and McAdam, 1988; 
McAdam, 1985). Finally, our framework has taken the perspective of a single constrained actor 
who is exercising agency. Yet network action is not pursued in a vacuum. Future research could 
profitably examine the interplay of constrained agency across groups of actors. For example, 
when an actor operates in a given mode of constrained agency, how is the propensity of other 
actors to operate in that or other modes affected? In short, we believe that this conceptualization 
of constrained agency represents an important first step in unlocking new sources of endogenous 
change in network structure. 
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Table 1. Forms of Constrained Agency 
  
Instrumental action 
 
 
Expressive action 
 
 
Capability-based 
resources 
 
 
 
 
Maneuvering: Using capabilities (skills, dispositions, 
and cognitive orientations) to acquire information or 
influence  
 
Constraint operates primarily through insight. 
 
 
 
Fortifying: Using capabilities (skills, dispositions, and 
cognitive orientations) to share sentiments and support or 
affirm identities 
 
Constraint operates primarily through action.  
 
 
 
Symbolic 
resources 
 
 
 
 
 
Reorienting: Shifting meaning structures to acquire 
information or influence  
 
Constraint operates primarily through recombination. 
 
 
 
 
Anchoring: Shifting meaning structures to share 
sentiments and support or affirm identities 
 
Constraint operates primarily through meaning.  
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Figure 1. Network Actions and the Lifecycle of a Social Tie 
 
 
 
 
